There is quite some tension prevailing between India and Pakistan. Current situation is formed by a series of unfortunate events. In this post we try to trace current state of  relations between the two countries to their colonial past.

Introduction

India’s relations with Pakistan are shadowed to a great extent by the underlying mistrust and military conflicts. Two nations have been at wars three times since independence. Trade between the two countries is quite low and is marred by various sanctions and barriers imposed by two countries over one another. Kashmir issue is a prominent reason for tension between the two countries. Both blame each other for indulging in terrorist activities over each other’s territories. These and many other events have been the defining aspects of the relationships between India and Pakistan.

Major characteristics of India’s relations with Pakistan have their determining factors in the colonial past of the sub-continent. Indian freedom struggle was largely confined within the boundaries defined by the colonial policies and legal system. In fact colonial government’s policies and laws were quite a determining variable in the outcome of the struggle. One of the major roles played by these policies was to foster the communal divide between the Hindus and the Muslims. Further, these policies particularly influenced the elites of the two communities. Another important factor was the authoritarian centralised governance system that was established by the British. This system of governance was a direct outcome of the colonial rule and its attempt to subjugate the native population. Circumstances during the independence ensured that both India and Pakistan inherit this authoritarian centralised system of governance and continue with it even after the enforcement of self-adopted constitutions. This system adopted after independence gave elites within India and Pakistan an unprecedented power to determine policies of the government and implement such policies. In this paper I have shown that elites in the two countries, i.e. army and bureaucracy in Pakistan and political elites and bureaucracy in India, shaped the relation between the two countries. I have also shown the implications of the biasness of elites on such policy and subsequently implications of such policy on relations between the two countries.

In the first chapter I have listed the major events that portray India’s relations with Pakistan. I use these events to list the main characteristics that determine India’s relations with Pakistan. In the second and third chapter I trace the origins of these determining characteristics to the colonial past, hence establishing the impact of colonial rule on relations of India with Pakistan.

Research Methodology

Aims and Objectives

The aim of this paper is to study the impact of colonial rule on the relations of India with Pakistan.

The objectives of this paper are:

• To develop an understanding of the present relations between India and Pakistan and the main characteristics of the same.
• To understand colonial policies and legal system relevant to the construction of religious identities and creation of two nations in the sub-continent and assess implications of the same on present relations between the two nations.
• To look at the actions of different element within the independence movement and within the framework prescribed by colonial state, which in turn were largely affected by the colonial policies and assess the implications of the same on the relations between the two countries.

Scope and Limitations

The scope of the paper extends to the analysis of the relations between India and Pakistan, and the impact of policy of the colonial government on the same.

The basic limitation of the paper is that it discusses only the implications of colonial policy and other factors within the framework provided by such policies on the relations of India with Pakistan. This paper does not include other influencing factors like the international events, world wars and economic events etc.

Sources

The researcher has relied upon both primary and secondary sources such as communications between the viceroys and Secretary of State for India, letters and speeches of various political leaders in the freedom struggle, books, articles and research papers on the subject matter of this paper.

Mode of citation

The NLS Guide to Uniform Citation has been employed throughout the paper.

Hypothesis

In this paper I have argued that India’s relations with Pakistan are governed by mistrust and enmity which developed over the years of colonial rule. These combined with the strong centralised and authoritarian governance systems that the two countries inherited from their colonial past, form the basis of relation of India with Pakistan.

Research Questions

1. What is the nature of relations of India with Pakistan?
2. What are the main characteristics of relations of India with Pakistan?
3. What policies of the colonial government lead to the present nature of relationship between the two countries?

Method of writing

An analytical method of writing has been used in this paper.

Chapterization

Chapterization is as follows:

Chapter 1: Relations of India with Pakistan.

Chapter 2: Underlying misunderstanding and colonial rule.

Chapter 3: Colonial Policies that led to authoritarian centralised governments.

Chapter I: Relations of India with Pakistan

In this chapter I have focused on relationship of India with Pakistan since the independence of the two countries. By analysing the same I will trace the main characters of the relations between the two countries. Thereafter in the subsequent chapters I will associate the same with the colonial rule.

India and Pakistan got freedom from the colonial rule at the same time. Post-independence, the two countries grew into two very different directions. At the time of height of cold war, when the state structure was still in formation, a combination of domestic, regional and international factors worked to undermine the role of parties and politicians and enhanced that of the civil bureaucracy and the military.[1] Both states inherited colonial governing institutions that were predominantly based on authoritarian centralised systems.[2] Hence, unelected bureaucracy and armed forced formed an important consideration for determining the future course taken by the two countries. In case of Pakistan, it failed to evolve a democratic political system because of organizational weakness of Muslim League.[3] Further in the aftermath of Partition, neither elected nor did non-elected institutions have a decisive edge. It was precisely due to this power vacuum created by wayward and venal politicians in command of parties with no effective bases of political support that democratic institutions were unable to function and consequently military and civil bureaucracy could assert themselves decisively.[4] Hence, Pakistan turned out to have a centralised governance structure controlled by non-elected institutions with Islam as the central tenant of Pakistani nationalism. On the other hand congress was the main political party in India.[5] Lack of sufficient support base for the regional political players and presence of congress on lower levels ensured that will of congress was imposed in the initial days of independence.[6] While congress as the premier political party was undoubtedly the main player in the newly independent country, its ability to enforce central authority owed much to the civil bureaucracy and army.[7] Precisely because of this reason bureaucratic authoritarianism still remains embedded in the non-elected institutions of the Indian state. In fact regular elections have often been supplemented with authoritarian methods in the name of preserving law and order in different regions.[8] Hence, India evolved a strong centralised system that was controlled by nexus between elected and non-elected institutions. Thus, although federal in form, the Indian and Pakistani state structures have been unitary and authoritarian in substance.

Relations of India and Pakistan since independence have been governed by policies undertaken by these centralised institutions. In turn the stand of these institutions has been affected by the international circumstances, domestic considerations and colonial structure of the basic governing institutions. Relations between the two countries have been defined by the three wars since independence, Kashmir issue, issues with respect to annexation of multiple princely states post-independence, freedom of Bangladesh after 1971 war, river water dispute etc.[9] Following may be treated as the events that define the nature of relationship between India and Pakistan.

Kashmir Issue and annexation of princely states post-independence

British under viceroyalty of Lord Mountbatten adopted the Balkans Principle of partition.[10] Under this principle India and Pakistan were made out of the British controlled territory and it was left to the will of about six-hundred independent princely states to either join either of the countries or to stay independent.[11] There were multiple material considerations that determined whether which country an Independent state would join. These factors included geography, communal composition of the state etc. Nizam’s Hyderabad, Junagarh and Kashmir were couple of major states that had issues with respect to their future after independence.[12] While Hyderabad and Junagarh were taken over by swift action of the Indian armed forces considering the communal and geographical dynamics that favoured them being with the Indian state, the same was not true for Kashmir.[13] Geographically Kashmir was land locked and shared borders with both India and Pakistan. Communally Kashmir was a Muslim Majority state with a Hindu ruler. Kashmiri ruler Raja Hari Singh was unable to stand against the tribal military intrusion backed by Pakistan and asked for India’s help. Subsequently, Raja Hari Singh signed the document of accession to India and became a part of the India. Thereafter, United Nations intervened and the matter has since been unresolved.[14] Pakistan’s stand is that referendum be organised and accession be determined accordingly.[15] India on the other hand claims that the king of Kashmir signed accession document and acceded his territory to India. [16] This conflict between the powerful central governments of the two countries has ensured tension and human right violation in the state since 1947. In fact the two countries have twice been to war over the issue. Most of the strategic decisions pertaining to the issue are taken by the central governments of the two countries.[17] Further, role of local population in determining their faith is minimal and religion based propaganda since late 1980s has resulted in polarization in the communities living for generations in the state. Such communal polarization has resulted in development of mistrust and enmity within different elements in the state.[18]

Wars

Since independence India and Pakistan have fought three wars. While two of them were over the issue of Kashmir, one being an undeclared war in 1947 and another in 1964, the third war resulted in creation of Bangladesh.[19] Primary reason for these armed conflicts has been the underlying mistrust between the two countries. This mistrust is on account of greater resource base and military power that India has over Pakistan. Further, such fears of being subdued by the large and powerful Hindu population have their roots in the colonial rule.[20] In fact a look at the war time speeches of leaders of the two countries and newspaper reports suggests of underlying mistrust within the two countries. Editorials published in the newspapers of the two countries, loudspeaker announcements etc. clearly show the inherent hatred on the lines of religion prevalent in the dominant narrative in the two countries.[21] While media in Pakistan was heavily influenced by the army and the elite bureaucracy, it was free from the government control in India.[22] However, media houses are controlled by the elites who have close relations with the ruling political and bureaucracy elites and share the intellectual space with them.[23] Hence role of dominant thought process of the elites in the two countries and their ability to control both popular opinion and resources by virtue of sitting at the helm of centralised authoritarian system were primary reasons for such wars.

Formation of Bangladesh

Bangladesh emerged as an independent country in 1971. Punjabi dominated Pakistani army controlled the central government. Even though Bengalis were in majority, they did not have any control over the government, its policies and development initiatives. This sense of subjugation encouraged unrest in East Bengal. Pakistani army responded brutally violating human rights. Subsequently, India chose to intervene and this led to the war of 1971 as a result of which Bangladesh was created.[24] This war was supposedly on account of manufactured hatred by the centralised authoritarian governments in the two countries. The general mood in Pakistan was against India as India had been taking Bangladeshi refugees and had also been helping the rebels. This motivated insecure Pakistan backed by United States to invade India. On the other hand massive waves of Bangladeshi refugees were becoming a headache for the Indian government. Backed by the Soviet Union, India retaliated to Pakistani aggression and helped in liberation of Bangladesh.[25]

Water Dispute

Indus water treaty form the basis of water distribution between the two countries. It was brokered in 1960s by the World Bank. It was an outcome of the fears of Pakistan that India might cause famines and droughts as all the sources of the rivers of Indus river basin lay in the Indian Territory. Though it has been one of the most successful water sharing agreements and disputes have been resolved by resolution mechanisms given within the agreement, though tensions remain high.[26] Further regional demands within the two countries have largely remained unaddressed. For instance Kashmir has very little share under the Indus water treaty.[27] Even though demands have been made at the local level, nothing has been done because most of the decisions with respect to such issues in both nations are taken by authoritarian central governments without giving due consideration to regional demands. Further, recent disputes like the Baglihar dam and others have still not been resolved amicably. Hence, even though treaty has ensured distribution of Indus waters since its signing, attitude of the two central governments are increasingly making it difficult to implement the provisions of the treaty. This is particularly so with the dispute resolution system prescribed under the treaty.[28]

Trade and Commerce

Trade and commerce have been low and potential of the same unexplored. In fact much of the trade between the two countries takes place by the route of third country.[29] Trade embargo is imposed by the central governments on the two countries as a result of constant struggles and hostilities between the two countries.

A pattern of constant hostility and mistrust can be traced in the history of relations between the two countries. Further decisions of central governments of the two countries have played a major role in shaping the history of conflict between the two countries. Hence, we can safely conclude that the main characteristics of the relations of India with Pakistan are the underling mistrust and the policy of the central governments of the two countries.

In the subsequent chapters I will show the precise reasons for the underlying mistrust between the two countries and roots of same in the colonial rule. I will also show that important aspects of the relations between the two countries are determined by the decisions of the authoritarian central governments that in turn are greatly influenced by the biases having their origins in the colonial rule.

Chapter II: Underlying mistrust and colonial rule

Hinduism and Islam never existed in the Indian sub-continent in the manner they were perceived and subsequently constructed by the Europeans. In fact the limits imposed by meta-frame of thought process made European historians i.e. Indologists and Imperialists construct religious identities of the native population in a semantic manner i.e. assign every religion a text, assign them a place of worship etc. This construct was further affected by the selective and limited resources used for such construction.[30] This construction based on limited consultation was used as a basis for the colonial policies and laws. Policies like options in census and laws like personal laws, imposed by the colonial government on the natives were structured on the basis of their understanding of the sub-continent’s society.[31] An interesting implication of adopting these constructs in the form of policies and laws was that the sub-continent’s society modified itself in confirmation with this construct. Over the years Hinduism and Islam came to be perceived as the primary religions of the sub-continent. With time the people of the sub-continent started associating themselves with the two separate religious identities.[32]

British blamed the revolt of 1857 principally on Muslims. This resulted in them confining themselves to the pro Hindu policy. Impact of this policy can be realised by the fact that by 1871 there were 711 Hindu officials against 92 Muslims in the British administration.[33] However, a different view on the issue has been taken by Bose and Jalal. They are of the opinion that it was a mixed movement, not driven by particular community, but by shared interests. However they agree that the Hindu upper castes were able to secure greater share in the administration.[34] Hence, as the colonial rule progressed, material differences started to appear between the two communities. Hindus were swift to adopt the foreign education, become part of the bureaucracy, judiciary, bar and other prestigious positions. In fact most of the upper caste Hindus were also politically organised in the form of Indian National Congress.[35] On the other hand, Muslims, who were indeed powerful in the medieval times, were devoid of any authority and benefits of the colonial rule.[36] This situation was realised and articulated to a great extent by Syed Ahmed Khan, who proposed that for progress of the Muslim community they must pursue western education and secure positions in the administration.[37] Sir William Wilson Hunter, a senior Bengal civilian, blamed backwardness of Muslims on the inherent nature of their religion. He cited various statistics and proposed to include Indian Muslims in the administration in order to facilitate their progress.[38] Further, steps like introduction of Hindi as a language for writing petitions to the court along with Urdu made the Muslim population feel subjugation and generated a curious nostalgia for a glorious past.[39] However this sense was only prevalent among the Muslim elites and cannot be generalised to the masses.[40] This sense of subjugation transformed to insecurity at a later stage.

Policies of the colonial government contributed to the divide. Partition of Bengal and separate electorate for Muslims under the Indian Councils act of 1909 were two events that contributed to the creation of communal divide between the two communities. While Muslims favoured the partition of Bengal, congress was vehemently against it. As far as the question of separate electorate of 1909 was concerned, letters from lord Minto to the then secretary of state lord Morley clearly show that the British wanted to counterpoise the growing power of congress by helping Muslims raise as a political class.[41] Shimla deputation of 1906 and subsequent enactment in 1909 served the British interests in the form of creation of a political class of elite Muslims. This political class served as a counter balance to the Congress, which was then a party composed of Hindu upper caste elites.[42] It also resulted in creation of the Muslim league.[43]

Hence the material differences between the two communities i.e. the Hindus and the Muslims, was the origin of enmity and mistrust between the two communities. In order to have equal footing and protect their interests, elites of both communities organised themselves in political parties and prescribed religious identities to the same. This organization on religious lines was motivated by colonial construct of religious identities and policies of the colonial government that motivated prescription to such identities.[44] This thought construct of the elites prevailed even when the Congress and the Muslim league were transformed to a party of the masses.[45] Various speeches of Mouhammad Ali Jinnah suggest the prevalence of similar construct. In the presidential address to the annual session of the Muslim League held at Lucknow in 1937, Jinnah stated that the principle of parliamentary democracy cannot be applied to the heterogeneous Indian population. He was of the opinion that the Hinduism and Islam represent two distinct and separate civilizations. These civilizations have different and in some cases conflicting interests. The majority of Hindus in an undivided country would work towards the furtherance of their own interests and ignore large Muslim minority. This would lead to conflicts.[46] In his famous address in March 1940, in the meeting of Muslim league held at Lahore, Jinnah stated that a separate Muslim homeland was a solution to this problem.[47] While on the face of it Congress prescribed to secular notions, in the political circumstances that prevailed then, it undoubtedly appeared to be a party advocating against the interests of Muslims.[48] This appeared to be particularly so in the late forties and at the time when negotiations for independence were on.[49] As the Muslim League and Congress became increasingly powerful,

Riots, violence during the partition, direct action plan etc. were a manifestation of this divide and thought process, which in turn was a direct outcome of the colonial rule. This enmity and mistrust was carried forward and formed an important basis of post-independence relations of India with Pakistan. However, this enmity and mistrust was largely limited to the upper class elites of the two communities. It was only in the later stages of freedom struggle, when both Congress and Muslim League expanded their support base to the masses that the mistrust and hatred of the two communities became generalised. However it was only inherent to the elites and served their interests. At lower levels relations between the two communities were far more complex and had existed for generations.[50]

Hence, we may safely conclude that enmity and mistrust as ideologies were internalised primarily in the minds of elites of the two communities. Further this internalization was a direct outcome of the colonial rule.

Chapter III: Colonial policies that lead to authoritarian centralised governments

Authoritarian central governments in both India and Pakistan have their legacies in the colonial rule. According to Bipin Chandra the core purpose in the three stages of colonialism was to control the sub-continent in such a manner so that its resources can be utilised for the benefit of the Great Britain.[51] Governance structure, later adopted by India and Pakistan after independence, was largely a manifestation of the British undertakings during the third stage of colonialism. In order to secure the capital investments of the investors from the Great Britain, a strong authoritarian centralised government had to be established. In order to administer and maintain law and order such government had to have an efficient and large bureaucracy and army.[52] While army was modernised and disciplined, a large bureaucracy was realised in the form of recruitments on various levels.[53] This raising of bureaucracy was also supported by a set of laws that were used to make the central governments ever powerful.

First attempts at centralization were made in the form of passing legislations that made central government in the sub-continent powerful.[54] While central government was introduced in India by the Charter Act of 1833, it was only after the revolt of 1857 that the administration of India was made unitary and centralised by the Government of India Act of 1858.[55] Demands of Indians to be made part of the governance process was realised in the form of Indian Councils Act of 1861. However a close look suggests that the Viceroy had complete control over the functioning of such councils. He had the power to appoint Indians to the legislative councils and their function was of very limited nature.[56] While the subsequent legislations such as the Indian Councils Act of 1909 expanded the size of legislative councils and included more elected and non-elected members and the Government of India Act of 1919 introduced diarchy and bicameralism, Viceroy and the central government still exercised final say in all policy matters.[57] Lastly Government of India Act of 1935, which forms the fundamental basis of the constitutions of independent India and Pakistan, was also on similar lines. It abolished diarchy at the provincial level and introduced the same at the central level. Further by introducing the two levels of government, one at the provincial level and another at the state level, it introduced federalism in India.[58] However, most of the provisions of the 1935 act, including the provisions with respect to federalism remained largely unrealised due to the Second World War.[59] In fact governance remained centralised in nature with Viceroy having the ultimate power to decide upon all the issues and had the power to veto any decision of the councils.[60]

After independence India and Pakistan inherited more or less similar system of governance with slight modifications by virtue of Independence of India Act of 1947. Even drafting of the constitution was heavily influenced by the Government of India act of 1935 and catered to the interests of the elite sections of the two countries. These constitutions also brought along the centralised authoritarian government in the form of centre being more powerful than the state and centre having the primary say in the policy matters with the states being secondary units with substantially lesser power. Central government’s role under these constitutions was largely to protect the unity of the newly independent countries.[61]

Post-Independence, India and Pakistan established authoritarian and centralised systems of governance. This centralised system gave the central government an unprecedented power to supervene the interests of provinces, different sections of the society etc. and impose a single centralised narrative.[62] According to Bose and Jalal, while such a system was important for the survival of the newly independent nations with extraordinary diversity, it ensured that the colonial system of governance was carried forward even after the independence.[63] Hence, central governments comprising of elected and non-elected elites were at the helm of power. Elected members comprised of political representatives and the non-elected elites comprised of army and the bureaucracy.[64] Further, foreign policy was an exclusive domain of the central governments in the two countries.[65] Hence, relations between the two countries were to be dominated by the dominant narrative prevalent in the minds of controllers of the central governments.

Conclusion

The last two chapters trace the impact of colonial rule and policies of the colonial government on the identity construction of the Hindus and Muslims, creation of mistrust between the two communities and formation of authoritarian centralised governments in India and Pakistan. In these chapters I draw two major conclusions. Firstly, mistrust and enmity between Hindus and Muslims was a direct result of the policies of the colonial government and politics of self-interest by the two communities. Further, such enmity and mistrust were only confined to the elite sections of the two communities. Secondly, centralised authoritarian government was inherited by India and Pakistan from the colonial government. This form of government, which also controlled the foreign policy of the two countries, was controlled by the elites of the two nations. Hence, under such circumstances foreign policy of two countries was directly influenced by the biases of the ruling elites. Thus, as bias of the elites was primarily composed of mistrust and enmity, these two form the basic characteristics of the relations of India with Pakistan. This is not to say that mistrust and enmity were not present in the dominant narrative prevalent in lower sections of the society. However, the fact that elites were in control of the centralised authoritarian government in the form of them being part of the army and bureaucracy in Pakistan and elite political class and bureaucracy in India, makes their biases all the more important. Foreign policy of the two countries is the exclusive domain of the central governments of the two countries. The ruling elites, who in turn control the government, rely on their biases to formulate the foreign policy.

While limiting focus only on policy of the colonial government might appear to be a serious drawback, it in fact offers the widest perspective of the then colonial society. This is on account of the fact that policy of a government is formed keeping in mind the actual structure of the then existing society. Hence, even though resources relied on in the paper are limited, they are the best manifestation of colonial rule.

Hence, we can conclude that India’s relations with Pakistan are governed by mistrust and enmity which developed over the years of colonial rule. These combined with the strong centralised and authoritarian government that the two countries inherited from their colonial past, are the main characteristics of India’s relations with Pakistan.

Bibliography

Articles

1. A. Ahmed, The Making of India, 33(11/12) Social Scientist 3, 6 (2005).
2. A. Varshenay, India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism, 31(11) Asian Survey 997, 998 (1991).
3. S. Noor, Pakistan-India Relations and Terrorism, 60(2) Pakistan Horizon 65, 68 (2007).
4. P. T. Leeson, Media freedom, Political Knowledge, and Participation, 22(2) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 155, 164.
5. I. Singh, and K. S. Bhangoo, Irrigation System in Indian Punjab, 17(2) Munich Personal Archives 136, 142 (2013).
6. U. Z. Alam, Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: A Case Study of the Indus Waters Treaty, 168(4) The Geographical Journal 341, 344-346 (2002).
7. N. Taneja et al, Normalizing India Pakistan Trade, 6 (Working Paper No. 267, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, 2013).
8. B. R. Bhagat, Census and the Construction of Communalism in Colonial India, 36(46/47) Economic and Political Weekly 4352, 4354 (2001).
9. A. Peshkin, Education, the Muslim elite, and the creation of Pakistan, 6(2) Comparative Education review 152, 155 (1962).
10. G. Krishna, The Development of Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-1923, 25(3) The Journal of Asian Studies 413, 420 (1966).
11. B. Chandra, Colonialism, Stages of colonialism and the colonial state, 10(3) Journal of Contemporary Asia 272, 278-280 (1980).
12. M. G. khan, Coalition Government and Federal Structure in India, 64(3/4) The Indian Journal of Political Science 167, 171 (2003).
13. N. M. Masaldan, The Sphere of Political Government Under the Government of India Act 1935, 8(3) The Indian Journal of Political Science, 761, 763 (1947).
14. S. Nag, Nationhood and Displacement in Indian subcontinent, 36(51) Economic and Political Weekly 4753, 4757 (2001).

Books

1. S. Bose, and A. Jalal, Modern South Asian history, culture and political economy, (1998).
2. H. Kulke, and D. Rothermund, The History of India, (4^th edn., 2004).
3. P. Heeks, India’s Freedom Struggle: A short History, (1993).
4. B. Chandra et al, India’s Struggle for Independence, (1988).
5. B. R. Nanda, The Making of a Nation, (1998).
6. R. C. Majumdar, Struggle for Freedom, (1988).
7. K. Adeney, and A. Wyatt, Contemporary India, (2010).
8. M. E. David, Indian Legal and Constitutional History, (1984).
9. B. M. Gandhi, Landmarks in Indian Legal and Constitutional History, (10^th edn., 1993).
10. R. Guha, India After Gandhi, (2007).

Constitutions

1. The Constitution of India, 1950.
2. The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.

Essays in a book

1. H. F. Owen, The Nationalist Movement in A Cultural History of India, 391, 395 (A. L. Basham ed., 1975).
2. M. R. Anderson, Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India in Institutions and Ideologies: A SOAS South Asia Reader, 165, 169-173 (Arnold et al ed., 1993).
3. G. Pandey, Nationalism versus Communalism in Partition of India: Why 1947? 59, 63 (K. Roy ed., 2012).
4. A. I. Singh, The Success of the Muslim League: June 1945 to March 1946 in Partition of India: Why 1947? 199, 203 (K. Roy ed., 2012).

Letters

1. Letter from Lord Minto to Lord Morley (June 13, 1906) available at http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks05/0500261 h.html (Last visited on June 7, 2016).

Online sources

1. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict /2011/07/201178121 544 78992.html (Last visited on May 12, 2016).

Speeches

1. M. A. Jinnah, Presidential Address, Lucknow (1937), in http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islam links/txt_jinnah_luck now_193 7.h7.html (Visited on May 9, 2016).
2. M. A. Jinnah, Presidential Address, Lucknow (1937), in http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00isla mlinks/txt_jinnah_lahore_ 1940. html (Last Visited on May 9, 2016).

__________________________________________________________________

[1] S. Bose, and A. Jalal, Modern South Asian history, culture and political economy, 201,202 (1998).

[2] Id.

[3] Id. at 203-205.

[4] Id.at 204-208.

[5] A. Ahmed, The Making of India, 33(11/12) Social Scientist 3, 6 (2005).

[6] Id.at 8.

[7] Bose, supra note 4, at 213, 214.

[8] Bose, supra note 4, at 213.

[9] A. Varshenay, India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism, 31(11) Asian Survey 997, 998 (1991).

[10] H. Kulke, and D. Rothermund, The History of India, 223 (4^th edn., 2004).

[11] Id.

[12] R. Guha, India After Gandhi, 44-60 (2007).

[13] Id. at 59-64.

[14] Id. at 72-76.

[15] Id. at 79.

[16] Id. at 80.

[17] A. Varshney, India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism, 31(11) Asian Survey 997, 1005 (1991).

[18] Id. at 1015.

[19] S. Noor, Pakistan-India Relations and Terrorism, 60(2) Pakistan Horizon 65, 68 (2007).

[20] H. F. Owen, The Nationalist Movement in A Cultural History of India, 391, 395 (A. L. Basham ed., 1975).

[21] Bose, supra note 4, at 215, 217.

[22] P. T. Leeson, Media freedom, Political Knowledge, and Participation, 22(2) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 155, 164.

[23] Id.

[24] Bose, supra note 4, at 217.

[25] Bose, supra note 4, at 217.

[26] I. Singh, and K. S. Bhangoo, Irrigation System in Indian Punjab, 17(2) Munich Personal Archives 136, 142 (2013).

[27] Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/07/201178121 544 78992.html (Last visited on May 12, 2016).

[28] U. Z. Alam, Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: A Case Study of the Indus Waters Treaty, 168(4) The Geographical Journal 341, 344-346 (2002).

[29] N. Taneja et al, Normalizing India Pakistan Trade, 6 (Working Paper No. 267, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, 2013).

[30] M. R. Anderson, Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India in Institutions and Ideologies: A SOAS South Asia Reader, 165, 169-173 (Arnold et al ed., 1993).

[31] B. R. Bhagat, Census and the Construction of Communalism in Colonial India, 36(46/47) Economic and Political Weekly 4352, 4354 (2001).

[32] Id. at 4355.

[33] P. Heeks, India’s Freedom Struggle: A short History, 153 (1993).

[34] Bose, supra note 4, at 168.

[35] B. Chandra et al, India’s Struggle for Independence, 71-72 (1988); B. R. Nanda, The Making of a Nation, 73-74 (1998).

[36] A. Peshkin, Education, the Muslim elite, and the creation of Pakistan, 6(2) Comparative Education review 152, 155 (1962).

[37] Id. at 156.

[38] B. R. Nanda, The Making of a Nation, 74 (1998).

[39] R. C. Majumdar, Struggle for Freedom, 148 (1988).

[40] Nanda, Supra note 34, 71.

[41] Letter from Lord Minto to Lord Morley (June 13, 1906) available at http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks05/0500261 h.html (Last visited on June 7, 2016).

[42] G. Pandey, Nationalism versus Communalism in Partition of India: Why 1947? 59, 63 (K. Roy ed., 2012).

[43] Id.

[44] Bose, supra note 4, at 168.

[45] G. Krishna, The Development of Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-1923, 25(3) The Journal of Asian Studies 413, 420 (1966).

[46] M. A. Jinnah, Presidential Address, Lucknow (1937), in http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islam links/txt_jinnah_lucknow_1937.html (Last Visited on May 9, 2016).

[47] M. A. Jinnah, Presidential Address, Lucknow (1937), in http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00isla mlinks/txt_jinnah_lahore_1940.html (Last Visited on May 9, 2016).

[48] A. I. Singh, The Success of the Muslim League: June 1945 to March 1946 in Partition of India: Why 1947? 199, 203 (K. Roy ed., 2012).

[49] Id.

[50] K. Adeney, and A. Wyatt, Contemporary India, 227, 228 (2010).

[51] B. Chandra, Colonialism, Stages of colonialism and the colonial state, 10(3) Journal of Contemporary Asia 272, 278-280 (1980).

[52] Id.

[53] Id. at 280-283.

[54] M. G. khan, Coalition Government and Federal Structure in India, 64(3/4) The Indian Journal of Political Science 167, 171 (2003).

[55] M. E. David, Indian Legal and Constitutional History, 61-77 (1984).

[56] Id.

[57] B. M. Gandhi, Landmarks in Indian Legal and Constitutional History, 392-397 (10^th edn., 1993).

[58] Id. at 400, 401.

[59] N. M. Masaldan, The Sphere of Political Government Under the Government of India Act 1935, 8(3) The Indian Journal of Political Science, 761, 763 (1947).

[60] Id.

[61] Bose, supra note 4, at 201-209.

[62] S. Nag, Nationhood and Displacement in Indian subcontinent, 36(51) Economic and Political Weekly 4753, 4757 (2001).

[63] Bose, supra note 4, at 201-209.

[64] Bose, supra note 4, at 206.

[65] Schedule VII List I Entry 10-12, The Constitution of India, 1950; Article 46, The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.